# Jan 16 Notes

### 1 Continuing with the Budget Allocation Problem

#### 1.1 Algorithm

Let  $g(x) = e^{x-1}$  and  $y_i = \sum_j \frac{b_{ij} x_{ij}}{B_i}$ . When node  $j \in R$  "arrives" repetitively match dx of j to  $\operatorname{argmax}_{i:i\sim j} \{b_{ij} (1 - g(y_i))\}$  until either 1.  $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$ , i.e., node j is exhausted or 2.  $\min_{i:i\sim j} \{y_i\} = 1$ , i.e., the budgets of nodes connected to j are exhausted.

#### 1.2 Charging Policy

For each dx of j which is matched to i then increment  $\alpha_i$  by  $b_{ij}g(y_i)dx$  and  $\beta_j$  by  $b_{ij}(1-g(y_i))dx$ .

#### **1.3** Analysis of Competitive Ratio

The change in  $y_i$ , when dx arrives along edge  $j \to i$ , is  $dy_i = \frac{b_{ij}dx}{B_i}$ , or equivalently

$$b_{ij}dx = B_i dy_i.$$

Consequently, the change in  $\alpha_i$  is

$$d\alpha_i = b_{ij}g(y_i)dx = B_ig(y_i)dy_i.$$

From the analysis of the the water level algorithm we have that  $\int_0^{y_i^f} g(y_i) dy_i = g(y_i^f) - \frac{1}{e}$ . The final  $\alpha_i$  value is thus

$$\alpha_i = \int_0^{y_i^f} B_i g(y_i) dy_i = B_i \int_0^{y_i^f} g(y_i) dy_i = B_i \left( g(y_i^f) - \frac{1}{e} \right).$$

At the end of the algorithm if node *i* has exhausted its budget, i.e.,  $y_i^f = 1$  then  $\alpha_i = B_i \left(g(1) - \frac{1}{e}\right) = B_i \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right)$ . The alternative is that there is still budget remaining at node *i* and therefore  $y_i^f < 1$ . In this case, an adjacent node *j* will have  $\beta_j \ge b_{ij} \left(1 - g(y_i^f)\right)$ , as *j* will always assign to a node *i'*, say, with  $y_{i'} \le y_i^f$ . Consider the optimal set of edge assignment  $x_{ij}^*$ . For those edges adjacent to *i*, the value gathered from these edges is  $\sum_j b_{ij} x_{ij}^*$ , which is at most  $B_i$ , due to the budget constraint on *i*. The value gathered from the proposed algorithm is  $\alpha_i$  from node *i* and a selected contribution of  $\sum_j \beta_j x_{ij}^*$  from the nodes adjacent to *i*. From the bounds on  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_j$  above,

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha_i + \sum_j \beta_j x_{ij}^* &\geq B_i \left( g(y_i^f) - \frac{1}{e} \right) + \sum_j b_{ij} x_{ij}^* \left( 1 - g(y_i^f) \right) \\ &\geq \sum_j b_{ij} x_{ij}^* \left( g(y_i^f) - \frac{1}{e} \right) + \sum_j b_{ij} x_{ij}^* \left( 1 - g(y_i^f) \right) \text{ (from the constraints } \sum_j b_{ij} x_{ij}^* \leq B_i) \\ &\geq \sum_j b_{ij} x_{ij}^* \left( g(y_i^f) - \frac{1}{e} + 1 - g(y_i^f) \right) \\ &\geq \sum_j b_{ij} x_{ij}^* \left( 1 - \frac{1}{e} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Therefore extending the bounds over all nodes *i*, the competitive ratio is at least  $1 - \frac{1}{e}$ . *Exercise:* Convert the above analysis of the competitive ratio to a primal-dual proof.

### 2 Ranking Algorithm

#### 2.1 Algorithm

Consider a new online matching problem where a permutation  $\pi : [n] \to [n]$  is picked uniformly at random, where n is the number of nodes on the left. When j on the right arrives match it to

 $\operatorname{argmin}_{i:i \sim i} \left\{ \pi(i) : i \text{ is not yet matched} \right\}.$ 

An equivalent description is for each node *i* on the left to pick a  $Y_i \sim [0, 1]$ , uniformly at random. When *j* on the right arrives match it to

 $\operatorname{argmin}_{i:i \sim i} \{Y_i : i \text{ is not yet matched}\}.$ 

We consider the  $Y_i$ 's as "ranking" the nodes on the left from 1 to n, i.e.,  $\forall i, i'$  if  $Y_i \leq Y_{i'}$  then  $M(i) \leq M(i')$ , where  $M : [n] \to [n]$  is the "rank".

### 2.2 Charging Policy

For each j if j is matched to i then set  $\alpha_i = g(Y_i)$  and  $\beta_j = 1 - g(Y_i)$ .

#### 2.3 Analysis of Competitive Ratio

Fix the randomly assigned value of all nodes  $i' \neq i$ , i.e., all  $Y_{i'}$  is fixed for  $i' \neq i$ . Consider the effect of the matching on *i* for  $Y_i$  taken from 0 to 1. As  $Y_i$  increases from 0 to 1 then its rank against the other nodes will increase. Let  $y_i^f$  be the maximum  $Y_i$  value such that any larger  $Y_i$  doesn't change *i*'s rank, and therefore its match. Thus, the expected value of  $\alpha_i$  over all  $Y_i$  is

$$\mathbb{E}_{y_i}\left[\alpha_i\right] = \int_0^{y_i^f} g(y) dy = g(y_i^f) - \frac{1}{e}$$

If j is matched to node i when  $Y_i = y_i^f$  then decreasing  $Y_i$  will serve to improve the rank of i (decrease M(i)). Consequently, j may be matched to say i' which was previously higher in the ranking  $(M(i') \leq M(i))$  with a  $Y_{i'} \leq y_i^f$ . Therefore,  $\beta_j$  can only get larger i.e.,  $\beta_j \geq 1 - g(y_i^f)$ . It follows that  $\mathbb{E}_{y_i}[\alpha_i + \beta_j] \geq 1 - \frac{1}{e}$  and the competitive ratio is at least  $1 - \frac{1}{e}$ .

## 3 Vertex Weight Bipartite Matching Problem

Consider an adaptation of the ranking algorithm problem by assigned a matching profit of  $v_i \in \mathbb{R}_+$ , when a node *i* on the left is matched. The objective of the primal problem is consequently

$$\max \sum_{\forall i \text{ matched}} v_i.$$

#### 3.1 Charging Policy

For each j if j is matched to i then set  $\alpha_i = g(Y_i)v_i$  and  $\beta_j = (1 - g(Y_i))v_i$ .

**Exercise:** Extend the algorithm and analysis of the ranking algorithm to the vertex weighted bipartite matching problem.